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PETER MARGULIES∗ 
Reauthorizing the FISA Amendments Act: A 
Blueprint for Enhancing Privacy Protections and 
Preserving Foreign Intelligence Capabilities 
INTRODUCTION 
The reauthorization of § 702 of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA)1 in 20172 will 
trigger a vigorous legislative debate.  Under the current statute, the government 
 
© 2016 Peter Margulies      
 ∗  Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A., Colgate, 1978; J.D., Columbia Law 
School, 1981. 
 1.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012) (amended 2015); see United States v. Hasbajrami, No. 11-CR-623, 2016 WL 
1029500, at *4–13 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2016) (holding that § 702 was consistent with the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution); United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10–CR–00475–KI–1, 2014 WL 2866749, at 
*7–9, *12–27 (D. Or. June 24, 2014) (holding that § 702 was consistent with the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution); [Name Redacted by Court], at 36–77 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/20151106-702Mem_Opinion_Order_for_Public_Release.pdf (holding 
that § 702 was consistent with Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution); cf. In re Directives 
Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1016 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) 
(holding that the Protect America Act of 2007, a predecessor of § 702, was consistent with the Constitution). 
For a sampling of the extensive commentary on the FAA, compare Chris Inglis & Jeff Kosseff, In Defense of FAA 
Section 702: An Examination of Its Justification, Operational Employment, and Legal Underpinnings, HOOVER 
WORKING GROUP ON NATIONAL SECURITY, TECHNOLOGY, AND LAW, no. 1604, Apr. 27, 2016, at 2–4, 15–19, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/defense-faa-section-702-examination-its-justification-operational-employment-
and-legal-underpinnings (discussing origins of the program and current legal constraints), and David R. Shedd, 
Paul Rosenzweig & Charles D. Stimson, Maintaining America’s Ability to Collect Foreign Intelligence: The Section 
702 Program, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, May 13, 2016, at 4–7, http://www.heritage.org 
/research/reports/2016/05/maintaining-americas-ability-to-collect-foreign-intelligence-the-section-702-
program (noting § 702’s efficacy and downplaying privacy concerns), with LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE, 68–72 (Oxford Univ. Press 2016) 
(arguing that the FAA is a threat to privacy that has not received sustained public scrutiny because of its 
secrecy). See also Mieke Eoyang, Beyond Privacy & Security: The Role of the Telecommunications Industry in 
Electronic Surveillance, HOOVER WORKING GROUP ON NATIONAL SECURITY, TECHNOLOGY, AND LAW, no. 1603, 
Apr. 8, 2016, at 13–18, https://www.lawfareblog.com/beyond-privacy-security-role-telecommunications-
industry-electronic-surveillance-0 (discussing proposals for reform, including requiring that upstream 
collection and filtering for selectors be performed by private sector firms, which will turn over to government 
only those communications that match particular selectors); David S. Kris, Trends and Predictions in Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance: The FAA and Beyond, HOOVER WORKING GROUP ON NATIONAL SECURITY, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND LAW, No. 1601, Feb. 24, 2016, at 8–27, https://www.lawfareblog.com 
/trends-and-predictions-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-faa-and-beyond (discussing future issues relevant to 
FAA reauthorization); Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 
1039, 1103–08 (2016) (discussing the framework for implementing § 702 and suggesting that the administrative 
law model is the best paradigm for protecting privacy while ensuring effectiveness of program). 
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must obtain approval annually from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC) of a certification describing procedures for collection of communications 
likely to produce foreign intelligence information, in which one party is reasonably 
believed to be located abroad.3  Some legislators, joined by privacy and civil liberties 
advocates and former government officials, want to substantially limit the 
government’s power under the statute.4  Others, convinced that the statute plays a 
vital role in identifying terrorist and other national security threats, wish to 
reauthorize the statute with virtually no changes.5  This Article argues that changes 
to § 702 should strengthen technological safeguards for privacy, enhance 
transparency, and expand the public voice at the FISC, but stop short of 
surveillance critics’ principal goal: requiring a court order for all queries of U.S. 
person data incidentally collected under the statute.   
Even without taking that step, which would unduly hamper the collection of 
valuable foreign intelligence information, there is plenty to do in reforming § 702.  
First, consider the role of technology.  Congress should expressly mandate that the 
National Security Administration (NSA) use (1) the best feasible technology to limit 
the incidental collection of U.S. person data, particularly through so-called 
“upstream” collection at internet hubs, (2) scientific validation of all of its search 
techniques, and (3) due diligence to determine the status of a target and whether 
that individual is in the United States.  However, as it moves to limit undue 
collection of irrelevant data, Congress should recognize that dangerous gaps in 
relevant data might grow as technology evolves.  For that reason, Congress should 
permit the NSA to collect data for the purpose of determining whether legitimate 
 
 2.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a note (amended 2015) (setting sunset date of statute as Dec. 31, 2017).   
 3.  Id. at § 1881a. 
 4.  See Hearing on Oversight and Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act: The Balance between 
National Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) 
[hereinafter Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing] (statement of Elizabeth Goitein, Co-Director 
of Liberty & National Security Program, Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law) 
(suggesting that Congress should require that the government seek a court order for each specific query of 
information on U.S. citizens, lawful residents, or persons physically located in the U.S. that is incidentally 
collected under the statute); id. (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (suggesting that Congress should require that 
government seek a court order for each specific query of information on U.S. citizens, lawful residents, or 
persons physically located in the U.S. that is incidentally collected under the statute); see also Elizabeth Goitein 
& Faiza Patel, What Went Wrong with the FISA Court, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, Mar. 18, 2015, at 45–49, 
https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/what-went-wrong-fisa-court (setting out proposed reforms); cf. 
Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing (statement of David Medine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board) (recounting testimony by then Chair of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board) (same). 
 5.  See Inglis & Kosseff, supra note 1, at 2; Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 
4 (statement of Kenneth Wainstein); id. (statement of Rachel Brand, member of Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board) (suggesting that any changes to the program can be made without amending the statute).  
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surveillance targets outside the U.S. are using Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to 
spoof U.S. IP addresses and thereby thwart surveillance.6 
Congress should also mandate greater transparency. Transparency serves several 
purposes.7  First, it allows Congress, the FISC, and the public to accurately assess the 
size, scope, and nature of intelligence collection involving U.S. person data.8 
Second, transparency also has a useful ex ante prophylactic effect.9  The prospect of 
public exposure helps concentrate the bureaucratic mind, ensuring that officials 
only advance and implement programs that they can defend. Congress should 
require specific disclosure to the legislature of any and all instances in which the 
FISC concludes that the NSA has overstepped statutory bounds or that the 
government’s lawyers have been insufficiently candid in their filings with the FISC.10  
However, transparency does increase the risk of disclosing intelligence sources and 
methods.11  Furthermore, some information can be difficult to quantify and may 
not appreciably add to public knowledge of intelligence programs.12  Accordingly, 
Congress should resist calls to require the NSA to disclose the number of U.S. 
person communications that it incidentally collects.13   
In the area of judicial review, tailored reform should distinguish between two 
different kinds of incidental collection of U.S. person data.  Upstream collection at 
internet hubs should be more closely regulated, as it is under rulings of the FISC 
and current administrative rules.14  That regulation, which should include requiring 
a court order for U.S. person queries, is necessary since upstream collection is more 
likely to include U.S. person data that is wholly unrelated to foreign intelligence.15  
In contrast, downstream collection is already tailored to foreign intelligence 
targeting criteria;16 as a result, the U.S. person information incidentally collected is 
 
 6.  See Kris, supra note 1, at 22–24. 
 7.  See Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Elizabeth Goitein, 
Co-Director of Liberty & National Security Program, Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School 
of Law); DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 149–50; Goitein & Patel, supra note 4, at 46; Rachel Brand, Transparency in 
the Intelligence Community, LAWFARE (Nov. 2, 2015, 10:21 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/transparency-
intelligence-community#. 
 8.  See infra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
 9.  See infra notes 138–41 and accompanying text. 
 10.  See infra notes 161–70 and accompanying text. 
 11.  See infra notes 145–47 and accompanying text; see also Brand, Transparency, supra note 7. 
 12.  See infra notes 178–84 and accompanying text. 
 13.  See id.  
 14.  See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of David 
Medine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board); DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 151–52. 
 15.  See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Elizabeth 
Goitein, Co-Director of Liberty & National Security Program, Brennan Center for Justice at New York 
University School of Law); DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 151–52.  
 16.  See [Name Redacted by Court], at 34 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ 
20151106-702Mem_Opinion_Order_for_Public_Release.pdf; Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 
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more likely to be related to foreign intelligence information.17  With respect to 
downstream U.S. person data, this Article will demonstrate that requiring a court 
order could hinder the timely acquisition of foreign intelligence information.18  
In addition, FISC review of government certifications under § 702 would benefit 
from the presence of a robust public advocate.19  Currently, the FISC has statutory 
power to appoint amici curiae to assist in its deliberations and must explain in 
writing why it has failed to do so.20  An amicus curiae pushes the government 
toward greater clarity in its filings and prompts more precise and refined reflection 
by the FISC.  However, the FISC’s record on appointing amici continues to be 
spotty.  A November, 2015 opinion by Judge Hogan on § 702 benefited 
immeasurably from the probing and diligent arguments made by amicus, Amy 
Jeffress, a prominent Washington D.C. lawyer with substantial national security 
experience.21  However, a December, 2015, FISC opinion by Judge Hogan of the 
 
Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Rachel Brand, member of Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board); 
PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT, 93 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-
Report.pdf [hereinafter PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014]. 
 17.  See [Name Redacted by Court], at 34 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.dni.gov 
/files/documents/20151106-702Mem_Opinion_Order_for_Public_Release.pdf; Senate Judiciary Committee May 
2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Rachel Brand, member of Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board); PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16 passim. 
 18.  For a contrary view from former Vice President Walter Mondale, who as Vice President regarded the 
original Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) as a dangerous expansion of government power 
beyond traditional warrants to investigate criminal activity, see Walter F. Mondale, Robert A. Stein & 
Caitlinrose Fisher, No Longer a Neutral Magistrate: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in the Wake of the 
War on Terror, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2251, 2298–2301 (2016).  
 19.  In that respect, this Article shares the views of § 702’s critics and other commentators.  See DONOHUE, 
supra note 1, at 145–46; Mondale, et al., supra note 18, at 2297–98; Stephen I. Vladeck, The FISA Court and 
Article III, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1161, 1176–77 (2015). 
 20.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i)(2) (amended 2015); see also [Name Redacted by Court], at 5 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 
2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/20151106-702Mem_Opinion_Order_for_Public_Release.pdf; In re 
Application of the FBI for Orders Requiring the Production of Call Detail Records, No. [Redacted], at 24 (FISA 
Ct. Dec. 31, 2015), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/12312015BR_Memo_Opinion_for_Public_Release.pdf. 
 21.  See [Name Redacted by Court], passim (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/20151106-702Mem_Opinion_Order_for_Public_Release.pdf; see also Peter Margulies, Madison at 
Fort Meade: Checks, Balances, and the NSA, LAWFARE (May 10, 2016, 12:45 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/madison-fort-meade-checks-balances-and-nsa# (discussing importance of 
Jeffress’s work as amicus curiae).  Another prominent lawyer, Marc Zwillinger, served as amicus curiae in a 
recently disclosed opinion by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR), which reviews 
FISC decisions.  See In re Certified Question of Law, No. FISCR 16-01, at 1 (FISA Ct. Rev. Apr. 14, 2016), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/FISCR%20Opinion%2016-01.pdf (holding that when court-authorized pen 
register device that targets metadata, such as telephone numbers, results in incidental collection of post-cut-
through-digits (PCTD) – numbers, such as passwords, entered after placing a telephone call – such incidental 
collection does not violate federal statutes or the Fourth Amendment if agency rules limit use of PCTD when 
they constitute content, not merely call record information); cf. Orin Kerr, Relative vs. Absolute Approaches to 
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FISC was unduly dismissive of the need to appoint an amicus.22  This inconsistency 
does not serve the court in the longer term.  It also disserves Congress, the public, 
and the intelligence community, all of which benefit from the fullest feasible airing 
of different perspectives at the FISC.  A broader public advocate empowered to 
participate in a larger range of FISC matters would enhance the FISC’s 
deliberations.   
The Article is in four Parts. Part I discusses the history of the FAA, and describes 
the manner in which the government collects and uses data under the statute.  Part 
II urges legislative changes that would enhance technological safeguards for privacy 
in foreign intelligence collection and use.  Part III discusses judicial review and 
other regulation of agency action under the FAA, arguing against requiring a 
warrant for querying U.S. person information currently collected “downstream” 
through internet service providers (ISPs). According to this Part, requiring a court 
order to query downstream collection would hamper efforts to “connect the dots” 
in counterterrorism efforts.  Moreover, limiting FBI access to FAA data in ongoing 
investigations would needlessly stifle the FBI’s efforts to find patterns in terrorist 
activity. However, to make the FISC an even more robust monitor of best practices 
in surveillance, this Part also argues that a more robust public advocate is vital for 
FISC proceedings.  Finally, Part IV suggests features that would enhance the 
transparency of intelligence community (IC) practices for Congress, the FISC, and 
the public.  Overall, these changes will ensure that the § 702 program remains 
effective, while providing greater privacy, legitimacy, and accountability.  
I. THE FAA: HISTORY AND CURRENT PRACTICE    
Congress enacted the FAA as a way to both enhance lawful intelligence collection 
and subject it to meaningful constraints.23  Momentum for enactment of the statute 
started with revelations in late 2005 that the Bush administration in the wake of the 
9/11 attacks had unilaterally allowed the NSA and other agencies, collaborating with 
the private sector, to collect both certain content information from 
communications made or received by U.S. persons, and metadata such as the 
numbers called.24  This broad surveillance effort, conducted outside any statutory 
framework, was called the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP).25  After a post-
 
the Content/Metadata Line, LAWFARE (Aug. 25, 2016), https://lawfareblog.com/relative-vs-absolute-approaches-
contentmetadata-line (discussing FISCR decision). 
 22.  In re Application of the FBI for Orders Requiring the Production of Call Detail Records, No. 
[Redacted], at 23–24 (FISA Ct. Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/12312015BR_Memo_ 
Opinion_for_Public_Release.pdf.  
 23. See Inglis & Kosseff, supra note 1, at 4–8. 
 24.  See Kris, supra note 1, at 3; Shedd et al., supra note 1, at 2. 
 25.  William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles and Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 
1641–43 (2010). 
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disclosure interlude in which the FISC permitted a modified form of the TSP, at 
least one FISC judge declined to reauthorize the program, highlighting the 
importance of a legislative fix.26  Congress, in a bipartisan effort including then-
senator Barack Obama, first passed the Protect America Act in 2007, and followed 
that with the FAA in 2008.27      
Under § 702 of the FAA,28 the government may engage in surveillance that 
targets the contents of communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to 
be located abroad when the surveillance will result in the collection of foreign 
intelligence information.29  Under § 702, the government submits a certification to 
the FISC describing its targeting protocols, as well as minimization rules that 
diminish the probability that analysts will use or retain purely domestic 
communications or irrelevant information about U.S. persons.30  The FISC reviews 
these targeting and minimization protocols, although the FISC does not approve in 
advance individual targets of surveillance.31   
In addition, under § 702, foreign intelligence information that the government 
may acquire includes data related to national security, such as information 
concerning an “actual or potential attack” or “other grave hostile acts [by a] foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power.”32  Foreign intelligence information also 
comprises information relating to possible sabotage33 and clandestine foreign 
“intelligence activities.”34  Another prong of the definition is broader, encompassing 
information relating to the “the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United 
States.”35 
Commentators have often acknowledged the effectiveness of the § 702 program.  
For example, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), which had 
access to classified information in the course of its review of the program, 
 
 26.  Id. at 1643. 
 27.  Id. at 1644. 
 28.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012) (amended 2015). 
 29.  Id. at § 1881a(a).  For further discussion of this subsection, see Peter Margulies, The NSA in Global 
Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights, and International Counterterrorism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2140 
(2014); Peter Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Foreign Content Collection 
After Snowden, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 17 (2014) [hereinafter Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance].  
 30.  See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, LIBERTY AND 
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD, 135–36 (Dec. 12, 2013) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP]. This 
Article defines U.S. persons as U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, as well as persons physically located 
within the U.S.  
 31.  Id. at 135–36, 152–53. 
 32.  50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(A) (2012).   
 33.  Id. at § 1801(e)(1)(B). 
 34.  Id. at § 1801(e)(1)(C). 
 35.  Id. at § 1801(e)(2)(B). See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990) (holding that 
the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause does not protect non-U.S. persons located outside the territorial 
U.S.). 
Margulies Page Proof v3 (Do Not Delete) 12/5/2016  8:11 PM 
 Peter Margulies 
Vol. 12, No. 1 2016 29 
recognized § 702 had consistently produced helpful information about the 
structure, operation, and plans of terrorist groups.36  The President’s Review Group 
rendered a similar opinion.37  However, a balanced assessment of § 702 must also 
weigh its costs to privacy38 and consider approaches for minimizing those costs.39  
II. TECHNOLOGY IN THE SERVICE OF PRIVACY 
Technology is a double-edged sword.  Much has been written on how technology 
constitutes a threat to privacy.40  Pursuant to § 702, the NSA makes use of cutting-
edge technology to collect foreign intelligence information.41  Technology can be 
intrusive if its uses are not controlled.  However, technology can also enhance 
privacy, enabling more effective constraints on government surveillance.42  When 
intelligence collection with new technology risks heightened intrusions, Congress 
should also insist that government use the best feasible technology to protect 
privacy. 
One example of this is described in the November, 2015 FISC opinion by Judge 
Thomas Hogan.  A recurrent theme in Judge Hogan’s opinion is the use of search 
filters by law enforcement agencies such as the FBI to ensure that only trained 
 
 36.  PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16; accord Peter Swire, U.S. Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and 
Reforms Since 2013 10 (Ga. Tech. Scheller Coll. of Bus., Research Paper No. 36, Dec. 18, 2015); Shedd et al., 
supra note 1, at 4 (noting the PCLOB’s finding “that the Section 702 program has indeed helped in the fight 
against terrorism.”); Inglis & Kosseff, supra note 1, at 19–20. 
 37.  See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP, supra note 30, at 144–45 (noting that in great majority of 
counterterrorism investigations since 2007 that “resulted in the prevention of terrorist attacks … information 
obtained under section 702 contributed … to the success of the investigation”). But see DONOHUE, supra note 1 
(taking a more skeptical view of intelligence programs’ effectiveness).   
 38.  See DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 68–72 (noting privacy issues with § 702); cf. Margo Schlanger, 
Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 112 (2015) 
(suggesting U.S. policymakers do not adequately incorporate the costs to civil liberties in the overall assessment 
of program values); Rachel Brand, What Does Effective Intelligence Oversight Look Like?, LAWFARE (May 3, 2016), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-does-effective-intelligence-oversight-look (stating that agencies should ask 
“whether they should engage in particular intelligence activities even if they can as a matter of law.”).  
 39.  See Ashley Deeks, Intelligence Services, Peer Constraints, and the Law, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J 1, 2 (2015) 
(discussing constraining influence on U.S. of other states’ intelligence services); Shirin Sinnar, Institutionalising 
Rights in the National Security Executive, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 294–98 (2015) (discussing the merits 
of establishing units in the U.S. executive branch to foster compliance with civil and human rights). 
 40.  See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 46–47 (Harvard Univ. Press 2015); Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2021–22 (2013). 
 41.  PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 117.  
 42.  See John DeLong, Aligning the Compasses: A Journey through Compliance and Technology, IEEE 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY, 85–86 (July-Aug. 2014) (discussing technology that enhances compliance with legal 
rules); see also Ribert S. Litt, The Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age, 126 YALE L.J.F. 8, 18 (2016) (asserting 
that “technology can play an important role . . . in protecting privacy while enabling lawful collection of 
information by the government.”). 
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personnel have access to the § 702 database.43  As Judge Hogan noted, when FBI 
personnel enter a query that results in a “hit” on data that those employees are not 
cleared to see, a search filter blocks that data, although the querying employee does 
receive notice that the search terms have resulted in a positive match.44  Agencies 
can and do equip their software with the capability of sending alerts to supervisory 
personnel when an employee attempts to gain access to data without 
authorization.45   
This software also facilitates audits that analyze unauthorized queries and find 
patterns in such incidents.46  Improving alert and audit technology is vital to 
enhancing compliance with legal rules.  The FISC should receive updates on the 
implementation of this technology as part of the certification process.  In 
reauthorizing § 702, Congress should require that the NSA and law enforcement 
agencies implement the best feasible technology to perform these alert and audit 
functions.  
Another valuable example highlighted by former PCLOB Chair David Medine is 
requiring the best feasible technology to reduce the incidental collection under § 
702 of U.S. person information and minimize its use.47  The NSA collects § 702 data 
in two forms: through specific requests to ISPs and telecommunications companies 
(the PRISM or downstream program) and through scanning the contents of 
international internet transmissions at hubs that comprise the Internet’s backbone 
(the upstream program).48  Upstream scanning raises the risk of acquiring purely 
domestic communications that the government can intentionally obtain only with a 
traditional warrant.49  Without careful regulation, therefore, the scanning of 
upstream communications could allow the government to circumvent a large part 
of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections.   
The potential to collect purely domestic content arises due to the Internet’s 
architecture and current limits on the NSA’s own technological prowess.50  The 
 
 43.  See [Name Redacted by Court], at 28 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015) (noting that technological safeguards 
applicable to FBI queries of § 702 data will deny access to query information for an official who has not received 
proper training or is otherwise not authorized to obtain access).   
 44.  Id. 
 45.  For further discussion of the importance of use restrictions reinforced by technological controls, see 
Jane Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 TEX. L. REV. 205 (2015) (discussing the importance of use restrictions 
reinforced by technological controls).  
 46.  See Litt, supra note 42, at 18.  
 47.  For further discussion of the importance of using the best feasible technology, see Senate Judiciary 
Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4, at 10 (statement of David Medine, Chairman, Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight Board).  
 48.  PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 7 (“There are two types of Section 702 acquisition: what 
has been referred to as ‘PRISM’ collection and ‘upstream’ collection.”). 
 49.  Id. at 36–38. 
 50.  See Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance, supra note 29.  
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Internet divides and combines individual communications into packets.51  Devices 
such as routers that manage packet transmission will take the most efficient path 
available.52  Sometimes the most efficient path for a particular packet of domestic 
communications lies through equipment typically used by foreign nationals located 
abroad.53  An NSA device monitoring hubs used by foreign nationals overseas will 
then pick up this domestic communication.54  An ISP may also change protocols in 
a fashion that makes it more likely that some of the user’s communications will run 
through such equipment.55   
In upstream collection, the interaction of internet architecture and limited 
technology yields an additional risk that the NSA will collect purely domestic 
communications.56  Because upstream collection occurs at the Internet backbone, 
the NSA obtains data in the form of communications “transactions.”57  A 
transaction is any set of data traversing the Internet that a device aggregates or 
divides to facilitate transmission.  Internet transactions are two-fold.58  The first is a 
single communication.59  The second, called a multiple communications transaction 
(MCT), contains many individual communications.60  For example, at the internet 
backbone hubs where the NSA, in partnership with ISPs, scans for upstream 
collection, emails are often “bundled together within a single Internet 
transmission.”61     
As of April, 2016, public reports confirm that the NSA has been unable to design 
and implement a filter that reliably and uniformly collects only those specific emails 
in an MCT that are responsive to specific search requests.62  To collect the email that 
meets its search criteria, the NSA must sometimes collect entire MCTs, analogous 
to pages of personal emails.63  As with anyone’s email account, an entire page will 
include numerous messages on varying subjects from a spectrum of senders.64  
 
 51.  PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 38; In re Government’s ex parte Submission of 
Reauthorization Certification for 702 Program, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 157706, at 39–41 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) 
(Bates, J.). 
 52.  See DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 56. 
 53.  Id.  at 56–57. 
 54.  See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 38. 
 55.  Id. at 40. 
 56.  Id. at 40–41. 
 57.  Id. at 39. 
 58.  Id. at 41. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 41. 
 61.  See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP, supra note 30, at 141 n.137–38. 
 62.  See Inglis & Kosseff, supra note 1, at 12. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
MARGULIES Page Proof v3 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2016  8:11 PM 
 Reauthorizing the FISA Amendments Act 
32 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
Some MCTs include messages sent between persons located in the U.S. – i.e., purely 
domestic communications.65     
While today’s technological limits oblige the NSA to collect MCTs, those limits 
might  ease tomorrow.66  For example, the NSA or private firms might develop a 
scanning methodology that can reliably identify, isolate, and extract individual 
selector-based emails within a larger packet, thus obviating the MCT issue.67  
Congress and the FISC are not well-situated to determine what that technology is, 
and when it will arrive.  However, Congress can mandate that the NSA regularly 
assess and update its methods to ensure that it uses the best feasible technology to 
collect data upstream.68  Moreover, Congress can mandate that the government 
include a representation to this effect in its certification for the FISC pursuant to § 
702, and that the FISC review the government’s representation.69  Congress can also 
require the Inspector General for the NSA to report to Congress on progress in this 
area.70 
This “best feasible technology” approach is flexible enough to give the NSA the 
room it needs to innovate.71  The best feasible technology standard will not lock the 
NSA into a particular method that is not practicable or scalable, or may be obsolete 
the day after tomorrow.72  By the same token, the standard will oblige the NSA to 
devote part of its technological prowess to technology that protects privacy.73  Given 
the intrusions on privacy that are necessary in the NSA’s work,74 that seems like a 
fair bargain.   
Congress should also expressly require the NSA to use the best feasible 
technology to evaluate its searches. Right now, anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
 
 65.  See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 41. 
 66.  See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, RECOMMENDATIONS ASSESSMENT REPORT, 21 (2016), 
https://www.pclob.gov/library/Recommendations_Assessment-Report.pdf (discussing Recommendation No. 
6). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  See Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4, at 10–11 (statement of David 
Medine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board) (recommending that Congress mandate that 
the NSA update its technology and report to Congress regularly on its progress). 
 69.  See id. at 10–11 (recommending that the government be required to evaluate the effectiveness of 
existing technology and investigate improvements). 
 70.  See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 75. 
 71.  See id. at 144 (suggesting that there should be an ongoing dialogue between the government, 
telecommunications providers, and independent experts to ensure that the best technology is being used, and 
that the determination should be continually revisited). 
 72.  See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 143–45. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See Jonathan Mayer et al., Evaluating the Privacy Properties of Telephone Metadata 5536 (Cynthia Dwok 
ed., PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. vol. 113 no. 20, 2016) (utilizing digital research and probabilistic analysis to 
show that collection of metadata such as call records can impose serious privacy consequences). 
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NSA lacks a uniform approach for evaluating the accuracy of its searches.75  In any 
case, its governing statutes do not mandate development or implementation of such 
a methodology.76  Although the NSA’s self-evaluation protocols are not publicly 
available, it seems reasonable to assume that, overall, the agency follows what I’ll 
call an individual expert judgment approach: in other words, it hires experts in 
cryptology, computers, and the Internet, and creates an environment in which these 
experts can develop their expertise in the service of the NSA’s multiple missions.77  
That individual expert judgment approach presumably figures in NSA’s work under 
§ 702.78  There is one major problem with the unadulterated reliance on expert 
judgment: expert judgment is not always what it is cracked up to be.79  Sometimes, it 
is neither particularly expert nor the exercise of judgment.80  Left to its own devices, 
expert judgment can run aground because of biases and other flaws in human 
inference.81  Studies of doctors, for example, show that medical decisions 
 
 75.  See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 86. 
 76.  See NSA Reports to the President’s Oversight Intelligence Board (IOB), NSA (May 3, 2016), 
https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/intelligence-oversight-board/index.shtml 
(suggesting that rules may vary but they contain the same hallmarks). 
 77.  DeLong, supra note 42, at 85–86 (suggesting that technology may be the best way to support oversight 
and compliance). 
 78.  It seems logical to assume that the NSA periodically reviews its work for evaluation purposes. Many of 
those evaluations are useful for showing when the NSA is on the right track and when it must make additional 
improvements. See id. (discussing the importance of workplace culture of inquiry and commitment to evolving 
best practices).  However, public reports do not indicate that the NSA has developed a systematic approach to 
evaluating its evaluative methodology, to ensure that it consistently and comprehensively uses the most advanced 
approaches that are feasible. Cf. PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16.  Congress should require this and 
periodic reports on progress toward that goal.  If, for security reasons, any of this information must be 
presented in a closed session or hearing, Congress has authority to conduct proceedings in that fashion.      
 79.  See Geir Kirkebøen, Decision Behaviour – Improving Expert Judgement, in MAKING ESSENTIAL CHOICES 
WITH SCANT INFORMATION: FRONT-END DECISION MAKING IN MAJOR PROJECTS 169, 179–90 (Terry Williams, 
Knut Samset & Kjell Sunnevåg eds., Palgrave-Macmillan 2009) (discussing how professional judgment is 
inferior to simple statistical models and subject to emotional and motivational biases). See generally Stephen C. 
Hora, Expert Judgment in Risk Analysis, Create Homeland Security Center 1, 1–11 (2009), 
http://create.usc.edu/sites/default/files/publications/expertjudgmentinriskanalysis_0.pdf (discussing what 
constitutes expert judgement).  
 80.  See Hora, supra note 79. See also Colin F. Camerer & Eric J. Johnson, The Process-Performance Paradox 
in Expert Judgment: Why do Experts Know so Much and Predict so Badly?, in TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF 
EXPERTISE: PROSPECTS AND LIMITS 195, 202–11 (K. Anders Ericsson & Jacqui Smith eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1991) (arguing that while experts are good at generating hypotheses and complex decision rules, those attributes 
have little impact on their performance). 
 81.  See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: 
Accuracy, Admissibility, and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2003) (“Our thesis is 
straightforward: actuarial methods have proven equal or superior to clinical judgments.”); Michelle M. Mello & 
David M. Studdert, Deconstructing Negligence: The Role of Individual and System Factors in Causing Medical 
Injuries, 96 GEO. L.J. 599, 605 (2008) (finding that doctors’ judgement errors were the most prevalent cause of 
injury claims); Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment and Risk Management in Juvenile Justice, A.B.A. CRIM. 
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determined by an expert’s judgment are often wrong, failing to take into account 
patients’ medical histories and responses to medications.82  All experts, including 
those specializing in surveillance algorithms, are subject to these errors.83 
Wrong calls at the NSA can have serious consequences.   Those wrong calls can 
result in two types of errors: false positives, in which the agency conducts 
surveillance on people who have no relation to terrorism or any other national 
security threat, and false negatives, in which the agency fails to detect threats.84  
Some of the NSA’s searches may create excessive numbers in at least one of these 
categories.85  However, these errors are not inevitable.86  Technology and methodical 
human review can identify these errors, diagnose their cause, and point the way 
toward better practices in the future.87  Congress should mandate the best feasible 
technology to accomplish that result. 
 
JUST. MAG., Winter 2013, at 10, 12–13 (observing that actuarial techniques for predicting recidivism among 
offenders that rely on a common list of factors are more accurate than unstructured clinical assessments). 
 82.  For a sobering discussion of the incidence and range of medication administration errors by trained 
nurses, see Steven D. Williams, et al., Causes of Medication Administration Errors in Hospitals: A Systematic 
Review of Quantitative and Qualitative Evidence, DRUG SAFETY: INT’L J. MED. TOXICOLOGY & DRUG EXPERIENCE, 
1045, 1063–64 (2013).   
 83.  Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773, 810–15 
(2015) (arguing for application of Daubert test on scientific evidence for validation of computer search 
techniques). 
 84.  False positives have drawn particular attention in the context of no-fly lists. See Latif v. Holder, 28 F. 
Supp. 3d 1134, 1153–54 (D. Or. 2014) (holding that the low evidentiary standard for placement on the No-Fly 
list combined with a lack of meaningful opportunity to be removed from the No-Fly list risks deprivation of 
constitutionally protected liberty interests); see also Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 
928–29 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that the government’s conceded error in placing plaintiff on a No-Fly list 
violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights); Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret Jurisdiction, 65 
EMORY L.J. 1313, 1318–19, 1346–47, 1351–53 (2016) (finding that the federal government’s process of putting 
someone on the No-Fly list is unconstitutional and does not improve airline security); cf. Abdelfattah v. United 
States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 787 F.3d 524, 529–31, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (describing plaintiff’s frustration 
over repeated security checks possibly triggered by information in government databases and holding that 
plaintiff could seek a remedy under both Privacy Act and U.S. Constitution, but denying relief on grounds that 
the plaintiff had not established facts to support relief sought). 
 85.  See Peter Margulies, Surveillance by Algorithm: The NSA, Computerized Intelligence Collection, and 
Human Rights, 68 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2657619.  
 86.  Id.  
 87.  See DeLong, supra note 42, at 88 (noting that “[t]he best way to achieve the benefits of technology in a 
compliance program, while minimizing as many of the risks as possible, is to have frequent, meaningful, and 
documented interactions among people, across all functional areas in an organization.”). Medical data analysts 
have made substantial progress in this area. Cf. Ruben Amarasingham et al., An Automated Model to Identify 
Heart Failure Patients at Risk for a 30-Day Readmission or Death Using Electronic Record Data, 48 MED. CARE 
981–82, 986–87 (2010) (describing and evaluating a model that performed well in identifying heart patients 
who, upon discharge from the hospital, were at great risk of imminent death or readmission; the model 
facilitated the provision of services that would reduce these risks).   
Margulies Page Proof v3 (Do Not Delete) 12/5/2016  8:11 PM 
 Peter Margulies 
Vol. 12, No. 1 2016 35 
An additional technological problem under § 702 is the uncertainty of using 
Internet Protocol addresses as proof of the location of a target of surveillance.   
Under § 702, the NSA can only target communications where one party to the 
communication is a non-U.S. person “reasonably believed to be located outside the 
United States.”88  However, IP addresses can be inaccurate.   An IP address that 
appears to be in Germany, Pakistan, or Hong Kong may actually belong to a user in 
the United States, or may appear as a foreign “hit” in an NSA search because a 
domestic user has accessed common, innocuous websites based abroad or domestic 
sites containing links to overseas sites.89  Without additional information, NSA 
collection may yield many false positives – people whose communications are 
targeted even though these individuals are actually located in the United States 
where the FAA precludes targeting by agencies such as the NSA.90  The PCLOB has 
stated that the NSA already deals with the false positive problem by using due 
diligence to ascertain a target’s U.S. person status and current location.91  That 
exercise of due diligence can entail checking “multiple sources.”92  In reauthorizing 
§ 702, Congress should write the due diligence standard into the law. 
In expressly requiring due diligence to ferret out false positives, Congress should 
also address the problem of false negatives, particularly those concerning VPNs.93  
An individual can use a VPN to mask or “spoof” her IP address.94  While the address 
might otherwise be readily recognized as being located outside the U.S., using a 
VPN allows such individuals to communicate with an apparent IP address that 
matches the VPN server’s location.95  As a result, an individual in Pakistan using a 
VPN could communicate using an apparent IP address from the United States.   An 
Al Qaeda or ISIS member could use such a method to avoid surveillance under § 
702.  Congress should expressly permit the NSA to use multiple sources to ascertain 
that a putative U.S. IP address is actually being used by a U.S. person or an 
individual located here.  The reauthorized statute should include a narrow 
provision that permits the NSA to acquire information on U.S. IP addresses that 
 
 88.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012) (amended 2015). 
 89.  See Letter from Jonathan Mayer, Stanford Univ. Sec. Lab., to Review Grp. on Intelligence and 
Commc’ns Techs., Office of the U.S. Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence 2 (Oct. 3, 2013) (noting the frequency of 
“[i]nstances where an American reasonably expects to interact with a domestic website – and is, in fact, 
interacting with a domestic website – where his or her browsing activity may nevertheless flow across 
international boundaries.”).  The domestic site may be as harmless and generic as a site run by the U.S. 
government itself, which features web apps sourced from abroad. Id. at 2–4. 
 90.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b) (2012) (amended 2015). 
 91.  See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 43–44; Kris, supra note 1, at 22–24 (discussing how 
the NSA analyst must look at the totality of the circumstances when making a determination if the target is in 
the United States).  
 92.  See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 43–44; Kris, supra note 1, at 23–24.  
 93.  See Kris, supra note 1, at 22 (discussing how VPNs operate in the context of location-spoofing). 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
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appear to be linked to tasked selectors.  The NSA should be allowed to engage in 
this acquisition for the purpose of detecting spoofed U.S. VPNs, subject to 
appropriate minimization procedures.96  
III. THE FISC AND OTHER SAFEGUARDS: QUERYING U.S. PERSON DATA, 
ESTABLISHING A PUBLIC ADVOCATE, AND CREATING A “COLLECTION 
AVOIDANCE” EXCEPTION TO MINIMIZATION REQUIREMENTS  
One central issue in § 702 reauthorization is whether Congress should require that 
officials obtain a court order before querying incidentally collected U.S. person § 
702 data. While some argue that any query for U.S. person information should 
require a specific court order specifying the subject of the query,97 this approach 
paints with too broad a brush.  Instead, the requirement of a court order should 
hinge – as it does under current NSA practice – on whether the NSA has collected 
the data upstream or downstream.98  This section elaborates on this point.  It also 
urges that Congress establish a more robust public advocate for FISC proceedings.  
The section then briefly addresses minimization requirements, arguing for an 
express exception for data that aids the NSA in avoiding collection on targets who 
have traveled to the United States.99  
 
 96.  See also infra notes 126–32 and accompanying text (discussing the implied exception to U.S. person or 
locational collection for assessing when an overseas subject has traveled to the U.S., thereby requiring cessation 
of collection, and suggesting that Congress make this implied exception express). 
 97.  DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 143; Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4 
(comments by Sen. Leahy and testimony of Elizabeth Goitein of the Brennan Center for Justice).  
 98.  See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 56–57 (discussing the limitations on NSA analysts 
when using a U.S. person identifier in both upstream and downstream collections). 
 99.  This Article does not take a position on whether Congress should amend the substantive provisions of 
the FAA, such as the subsection that defines the foreign intelligence information that the government can target 
for collection as including data “with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory” relating to the “the 
conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(B) (2012). Some insightful 
commentators have argued that this provision appears overbroad, particularly to Europeans and tribunals such 
as the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). See Timothy Edgar, Focusing PRISM: An Answer to 
European Privacy Concerns?, LAWFARE (Oct. 10, 2015, 5:20 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/focusing-prism-
answer-european-privacy-concerns; cf. Faiza Patel, Safe Harbor and Reforming Section 702, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 
22, 2015, 11:25 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/27009/safe-harbor-reforming-section-702/ (discussing 
concerns of both CJEU and U.S. privacy advocates). I agree that the U.S. needs to do more to convey to 
European stakeholders that activity authorized by this provision does not result in the indiscriminate collection, 
storage, or retention of the personal data of private citizens in Europe or elsewhere. See Peter Margulies, 
Transatlantic Setback or Invitation to Dialogue?: EU Data Regulators’ Verdict on Privacy Shield, LAWFARE (Apr. 
15, 2016, 9:52 AM),  https://www.lawfareblog.com/transatlantic-setback-or-invitation-dialogue-eu-data-
regulators-verdict-privacy-shield. Perhaps Congress can add a preamble to the FAA to this effect.  The language 
of any such preamble should avoid undue specificity about the collection authorized by the “foreign affairs” 
provision, such as collection on any foreign government officials who may collude with foreign entities to 
violate international trade agreements or other norms.  Undue specificity could be counterproductive, 
complicating U.S. diplomatic efforts and leaving the U.S. with fewer options in the complex arena of foreign 
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A. Distinguishing Queries: Upstream v. Downstream 
In considering whether to require a court order for querying incidentally collected 
U.S. person data, Congress should distinguish between upstream and downstream 
collection.  Analyzing collection through this prism will produce tailored limits that 
do not compromise an analyst’s ability to connect the dots.  In contrast, ignoring 
the differences between these two modes of collection could lead to dangerous gaps 
in the data on future threats.   
Importantly, the NSA, the Justice Department, and the FISC already understand 
this distinction.  The NSA has barred analysts from querying the upstream 
collection dataset with U.S. person identifiers.100  Moreover, according to Judge 
Hogan of the FISC, the FBI does not receive any unminimized information 
obtained through upstream collection.101 According to Judge Hogan, this limitation 
is crucial since upstream collection involves acquisition of MCTs.  It therefore 
collects a significant volume of information unrelated to tasked selectors.102  As a 
result, the upstream program is “more likely” than other programs to include U.S. 
person communications with no foreign intelligence value.103  Congress should 
expressly bar both FBI receipt of unminimized upstream data and any U.S. person 
queries by the NSA on communications incidentally collected under the upstream 
program, or any other program that scans communications as they pass through 
international Internet hubs.   
Downstream collection presents a different calculus.  In downstream collection, 
an ISP aggregates the content of communications involving a U.S. citizen or lawful 
resident (or another individual located in the U.S.) and a tasked selector linked to 
an individual reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.104 Because 
of these parameters, downstream collection is far more tailored than upstream 
collection.105  Downstream collection does not entail obtaining MCTs, which can 
include purely U.S. person content unrelated to a selector.106  Moreover, this 
information may have foreign intelligence value that requiring a court order would 
vitiate.  Suppose the government wished to know if a known ISIS operative in Syria 
or Iraq had emailed, telephoned, or described U.S. persons who have traveled 
overseas to fight on ISIS’s behalf or might wish to do so.  Further suppose that the 
 
relations. See Peter Margulies, Defining “Foreign Affairs” in Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act: The Virtues 
and Deficits of Post-Snowden Dialogue on U.S. Surveillance Policy, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1283, 1285–86 (2015) 
[hereinafter Margulies, Defining “Foreign Affairs”]. 
 100.  PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 56. 
 101.  [Name Redacted by Court], at 43 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015). 
 102.  Id. at 43–44. 
 103.  Id. at 44. 
 104.  Id. at 33–34. 
 105.  Id.  
 106.  Id. 
MARGULIES Page Proof v3 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2016  8:11 PM 
 Reauthorizing the FISA Amendments Act 
38 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
NSA or the FBI had a list of persons in the U.S. whom it suspected were forming 
such plans, but lacked sufficient evidence to obtain a warrant.  The plans of a 
terrorist recruit can change quickly, and a U.S. person planning to go abroad would 
probably not give the NSA or the FBI an engraved invitation to the airport gate.  
Even if the NSA or the FBI received some fresh information suggesting travel 
abroad was imminent, drafting a request for a warrant and waiting for a judge’s 
approval might consume too much time to stop the ISIS recruit.107  In this context, 
requiring a court order prior to a U.S. person query would clash with U.S. national 
security and foreign relations.108   
The statute should continue to give law enforcement the flexibility to design 
queries that yield useful information, whether or not those queries expressly focus 
on foreign intelligence information.  Judge Hogan of the FISC observed in his 
November, 2015 opinion that the posing of “queries designed to elicit evidence of 
ordinary crimes is not entirely unconnected to foreign intelligence.”109  Those links 
are more likely since § 702 collection targets are persons reasonably believed to 
“possess, receive, or communicate” foreign intelligence information.110  Given that 
limited sample population of targets, contacts of the targets may also have such 
links.  As Judge Hogan hinted, it is far more likely within the tailored downstream 
data set that a criminal scheme, involving identity theft, selling of contraband, 
money laundering, or kidnapping, would be linked to international terrorism or 
another foreign source.111  Judge Hogan was correct to assert that such links might 
be rare, but would nevertheless be of “substantial” intelligence value when law 
enforcement officials discovered them.112   
Proposals to provide an exception from the court order requirement under 
exigent circumstances113 do not grant the government sufficient flexibility.  Indeed, 
an exigent circumstances test would place the government in a Catch-22 dilemma.  
In the needles-in-haystacks world of foreign intelligence, meeting an exigent 
circumstances test requires access to data.114  Without data, the government is 
engaging in speculation, not addressing exigent circumstances.  However, without 
 
 107.  Cf. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of FISA, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) 
(noting that there is a “high degree of probability that requiring a warrant would hinder the government’s 
ability to collect time-sensitive information.”). 
 108.  See id. (observing that requiring a warrant would “impede the vital national security interests … at 
stake.”). 
 109.  See [Name Redacted by Court], at 42 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015). 
 110.  Id.  
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4, at 8 (statement of David 
Medine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board).  
 114.  Cf. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE STRUGGLE 
AGAINST TERRORISTS, 77 (2008) (noting risks and potential benefits of counterterrorism data analysis). 
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the ability to query incidentally collected U.S. person downstream data, the 
government may not obtain the data it needs to discover exigent circumstances.   For 
example, without the ability to craft specific queries involving U.S. person contacts 
of individuals abroad, officials might not learn in a timely fashion that a suspected 
ISIS recruit’s travel abroad was imminent.  Without that information, officials 
would  be unable to show exigent circumstances.  Placing the government in this 
bind sacrifices national security and foreign relations goals for marginal increases in 
privacy.  
B. Preserving the FBI’s Flexibility  
For similar reasons, Congress should not limit the occasions that permit FBI 
querying of the downstream § 702 database.  Some surveillance critics have argued 
that the FBI should be able to query downstream § 702 data only when the query 
figures in a current investigation.115   The FBI’s current practice, which permits 
queries in a range of circumstances, gives the FBI the agility it needs.116  Suppose 
that monitoring of a known terrorist chat-room provides a lead that the FBI wishes 
to check out by querying § 702 data.  Encouraging that initiative will allow the FBI 
to most efficiently “connect the dots.”  Restricting the ability to query § 702 data to 
a particular phase of an investigation stifles the FBI agents’ initiative and risks leads 
falling through the cracks.  That cabined mindset was disastrous in the run-up to 
9/11.117  Reintroducing that rigid perspective would put a crimp in the FBI’s ability 
to adapt to an ever-changing threat environment.   
C. Build in a Robust Public Advocate 
Rather than stifle the FBI agents’ initiative, Congress should institutionalize the role 
of a public advocate at the FISC.  A heartening element of the Hogan opinion is its 
thoughtful response to the vigorous advocacy of amicus curiae Amy Jeffress.118  As a 
number of commentators have noted, the addition of a public voice can only 
improve decision-making.119  Indeed, despite modest cavils, the 2015 FISC opinion 
 
 115.  Cf. Robert Loeb & Helen Klein Murillo, A Comprehensive Look at the FISC Order Legal Analysis, 
LAWFARE (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/comprehensive-look-fisc-order-legal-analysis 
(criticizing the November, 2015 FISC opinion and urging greater limits on FBI queries of § 702 data); Marcy 
Wheeler, Former Top Holder Aide Says Back Door Searches Violate Fourth Amendment; FISC Judge Thomas 
Hogan Doesn’t Care, EMPTYWHEEL (Apr. 22, 2016),  https://www.emptywheel.net/2016/04/22/former-top-
holder-aide-says-back-door-searches-violate-fourth-amendment-fisc-judge-thomas-hogan-doesnt-care/. 
 116.  See [Name Redacted by Court], at 29 n.27 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015). 
 117.  See Nathan Sales, Mending Walls: Information Sharing After the USA PATRIOT Act, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
1795, 1795–96 (2010). 
 118.  See [Name Redacted by Court], at 5–6 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015). 
 119.  See Wheeler, supra note 115 (praising Jeffress’s work as an amicus curiae); see also Margulies, Dynamic 
Surveillance, supra note 29, at 51–55 (noting the benefits of a public advocate in FISC decisions); Vladeck, supra 
note 19, at 1176–77 (emphasizing that “adversarial participation” in the FISC process would alleviate any 
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has the qualities of deliberation one would expect of a decision by an Article III 
court: the opinion considers alternative arguments and reasons carefully to a 
conclusion – attributes that Alexander Hamilton extolled in Federalist No. 78,120 an 
essay long considered the fount of wisdom on the virtues of judicial review. 
Congress, in reauthorizing § 702, should enhance the public voice by moving 
beyond the discretionary authority to appoint amici curiae established in the USA 
Freedom Act to a more thoroughly institutionalized public advocate.121  That 
advocate would be authorized to view a representative sample of § 702 selectors and 
queries, including U.S. person queries.122  The public advocate would also be 
empowered to petition the FISC if those queries or selectors appeared overbroad.123   
One possible objection is that a public advocate with such expansive 
responsibilities would also present greater security challenges.  However, this 
concern is less serious than it appears.  A public advocate would have to be chosen 
from the ranks of lawyers with wide experience in the executive branch.  Such 
lawyers would have a strong reputational interest in maintaining their credibility 
with the intelligence community, Congress, and the courts.124  A lawyer with this 
interest would be exceptionally diligent in maintaining secrets, protecting sources of 
methods, and safeguarding other information vital to national security.125  
D. Collection Avoidance and Minimization  
While minimization of data entails healthy limits on officials’ access to irrelevant 
information, current NSA practice acknowledges that in certain situations an 
exception to minimization can enhance privacy.  The FISC has recognized an 
implicit exception to minimization rules when information is useful in collection 
avoidance, i.e., in stopping collection in a timely manner when an overseas target’s 
travel to the U.S. renders continued surveillance illegal.126  Congress should codify 
this exception. 
 
Article III problems); Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The Constitutionality of a FISA “Special Advocate,” 
JUSTSECURITY (Nov. 4, 2013, 1:34pm), https://www.justsecurity.org/2873/fisa-special-advocate-constitution/ 
(indicating that there is no harm in having an extra lawyer participate in the decision-making process). 
 120.  THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 489–94 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961). 
 121.  Emily Berman, The Two Faces of the Foreign Surveillance Court, 91 IND. L.J. 1191, 1241 (2016) 
(emphasizing the importance of the adversarial process in FISA Court proceedings). 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict 
Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 509–13 (1994) (noting that lawyers, as “repeat-players” in 
litigation, often choose strategies that protect their reputations with other stakeholders in the process). 
 125.  Both Congress and the FISC obviously took this view of the role of the amici curiae.  Congress would 
not have provided for a panel of amici, and the FISC would not consider appointing them, if security were a 
concern. 
 126.  See [Name Redacted by Court], at 66–68 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015).   
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Minimization is a requirement pursuant to the statute to ensure that agencies do 
not retain personal data for a longer period than necessary.127  Under the statutory 
framework governing § 702 foreign intelligence collection, this is a major concern 
regarding U.S. person information.128  Agencies must typically purge this 
information within a specific period of time (five years or less) unless it is relevant 
to a foreign intelligence purpose or is evidence of a crime.129  
However, the NSA informed the FISC in 2015 that for a number of years it had 
retained information longer for collection avoidance reasons.130  Consider 
information collected when a surveillance target abroad entered the U.S. (in NSA 
parlance, became a “roamer”) and then used personal information linked to a U.S. 
person during that U.S. visit.  A “roamer” (who could be a terrorist, arms trafficker, 
diplomat, etc.) could use an email address that the NSA had tasked as a “selector” 
for collection purposes, but send those emails from an IP address associated with a 
U.S. person with whom the target was staying during the target’s visit to this 
country.  The NSA loads such data into a technological tool it uses to evaluate 
“alerts” it receives when a target may have entered the U.S.131 This use may be 
outside of any express statutory exception, but the NSA has described it as an 
implicit exception, since the information is retained not for collection or querying, 
but instead only for the limited purpose of determining when collection should 
cease.132  Judge Hogan of the FISC ultimately found that such an implicit exception 
was appropriate.133   
Congress should make this implicit exception express.  Eliminating the exception 
would hinder the NSA in determining when a target had entered the United States.  
It would therefore force the agency to be even more intrusive, not less.  To resolve 
the problem, Congress should include language that expressly authorizes the NSA 
to retain data used strictly for collection avoidance.  
 
 127.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (2012) (amended 2015) (requiring that agencies adopt “specific procedures 
. . . that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance to minimize 
the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of non-publicly available information concerning 
unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and 
disseminate foreign intelligence information”); cf. PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 50–51 
(explaining minimization under the statute). 
 128.  See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 50–51.  
 129.  Id. at 60. 
 130.  See [Name Redacted by Court] at 66–68 (FISC Ct. Nov. 6 2015) (noting that the NSA did not comply 
with requirements to age off communications collected in conjunction with the FBI within a fivc year period). 
 131.  Id. at 67–68 (explaining the process used to resolve alerts). 
 132.  See id. (noting that the Government has modified procedures to justify when communication 
collection is kept for longer than five years). 
 133.  Id. at 70–71. The FISC concluded that the NSA Minimization Procedures do not prohibit the NSA 
from keeping data for longer periods of time in an effort to ensure homeland safety. Id. 
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IV. TRANSPARENCY  
Transparency is another vital factor in § 702 reauthorization.  The Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has provided unprecedented transparency 
in the wake of Edward Snowden’s revelations.134  Moreover, the USA Freedom Act 
has introduced further openness.135  However, more needs to be done.  
A. Transparency’s Virtues and Risks 
Transparency has several virtues in democratic governance.  First, it allows 
Congress, the FISC, and the public to accurately assess the size, scope, and nature of 
intelligence collection involving U.S. person data.136  Transparency also allows these 
stakeholders to understand how the branches of government work together to 
review and oversee intelligence collection.137  With the benefit of transparency, 
stakeholders can see if the FISC has been unduly deferential to the government or if 
it has made intelligence collection needlessly cumbersome.   
Second, transparency has a useful ex ante effect.  The prospect of public exposure 
helps concentrate the bureaucratic mind, ensuring that officials only advance and 
implement programs that they can defend.138  In a system that lacks express 
transparency requirements, officials may overreach, with groupthink encouraging 
the illusion that unduly expansive interpretations of legal authorities will never be 
subject to public scrutiny.139  That heedless mindset is a collective illusion, since 
leaks from disgruntled personnel like Snowden will eventually result in public 
disclosure.140  An up-front transparency requirement rids officials of that illusion of 
opacity, forcing them to formulate and implement programs with an eye toward the 
 
 134.  For an insightful analysis of transparency’s risks and benefits, see Brand, Transparency, supra note 7; 
see also Carrie Cordero, The DNI’s New Transparency Implementation Plan, LAWFARE (Oct. 27, 2015, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/dnis-new-transparency-implementation-plan (describing transparency principles 
announced by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper).  
 135.  See USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 292 (2015). 
 136.  See DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 149 (discussing the vital function that transparency plays in a 
democratic state). 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  See Jack Goldsmith, A Partial Defense of the Front-Page Rule, HOOVER INST.: THE BRIEFING (Jan. 29, 
2014), http://www.hoover.org/research/partial-defense-front-page-rule (noting that disclosures have forced the 
intelligence community to justify itself and address tradeoffs that it could ignore when its activities remained 
secret).  
 139.  See Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1415–16 (2009) 
(discussing causes and effects of groupthink); Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential 
Spinoffs in National Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 801, 871–73 (2011) (analyzing the impact of 
groupthink on the functionality of executive agencies). 
 140.  See Goldsmith, supra note 138. 
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best public justifications they can present.  In a democracy, that early focus on 
public justifications is generally the best default position for government.141  
Transparency also buttresses the legitimacy of government programs.  
Perceptions of legitimacy rise if the current rules work and government is actually 
following those rules.142  Transparency can rebut surveillance critics who claim that 
overreaching is the norm. 
However, decreeing transparency as a universal default position can also trigger a 
negative effect on decision-making.  Lawmakers and the public intuitively 
understand that in areas such as attorney-client privilege, the law requires 
confidentiality to avoid chilling communication.143  The same concerns affect the 
formation and implementation of public policy.  The Framers recognized that 
sometimes a fishbowl is not the ideal venue for complex decisions involving 
national security and foreign affairs.144  In some contexts, disclosure of policies will 
limit policymakers’ options and undermine a decision’s implementation.145  For 
example, the Obama administration decided to make overtures to Iran that 
ultimately resulted in the U.S.-Iran nuclear accord.146  Early disclosure of those 
overtures might have scuttled negotiations with Iran, locking the administration 
into a hostile stance.  In the domain of surveillance, undue transparency can tip off 
adversaries and encourage them to modify their tactics to evade detection.147 
B. Current Examples of Transparency 
U.S. intelligence has made extraordinary strides toward greater transparency after 
Snowden’s disclosures.  Brief discussion of those innovations provides concrete 
evidence of transparency’s virtues and also helps identify areas for further reforms. 
 
 141.  See DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 149–50 (noting that the public discussion of the necessity for 
transparency in surveillance gathering has surfaced since the Snowden leaks). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (attorney-client privilege “encourages full 
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promotes broad public interests in 
the observe of law and the administration of justice”). 
 144.  See Margulies, Defining “Foreign Affairs,” supra note 99, at 1284, 1295 (noting that while the Framers 
believed in the value of transparency, they understood the utility of secrecy at times). 
 145.  See id. at 1295–96 (noting that the Framers recognized that premature disclosure could adversely affect 
certain policy options’ effectiveness).  
 146.  Cf. Asli U. Bali, Negotiating Nonproliferation: International Law and Delegation in the Iranian Nuclear 
Crisis, 61 UCLA L. REV. 232, 269 (2014) (discussing that overtures of Obama resulted from the first high-level 
bilateral meeting between America and Iran in thirty years).  
 147.  Cf. Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance, supra note 29, at 28 (noting that detailed government disclosure 
can impair surveillance and limit the choices available to decision makers). 
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After Snowden’s leaks, the ODNI began to release important FISC opinions.148  
The USA Freedom Act mandated continuation of this process.149  The result has 
been two-fold.  First, disclosure of FISC opinions has made clear that the court’s 
judges wrestle with the difficult problems of intelligence collection.  For example, 
Judge Reggie Walton expressed deep concern for wayward NSA practices that led to 
the use of identifiers under § 215 of the USA Patriot Act [now USAF] for which the 
agency lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion (RAS) of links to terrorism.150  
Judge Walton ordered the Justice Department for a period of almost one year to 
submit all proposed identifiers to the FISC for advance approval.151  The court 
permitted continuation of the program only when the Justice Department had 
conclusively demonstrated that it had overhauled its collection protocols to 
eliminate the problem of non-RAS-approved identifiers.152   
In the realm of ongoing NSA collection, Congress has already sought 
transparency in the USA Freedom Act, particularly the Act’s requirement that the 
NSA disclose the number of U.S. persons, specifically U.S. citizens or lawful 
permanent residents (LPRs) who have been subject to queries of data incidentally 
collected under § 702.153  On an annual basis, the NSA must publish a “transparency 
report” that discloses this and similar information about the impact of § 702 
surveillance on U.S. persons.154  
This report is useful.  For example, the 2015 report revealed that the NSA 
obtained under 5,000 court orders for querying the § 702 dataset regarding the 
content of U.S. persons’ communications.155 Armed with that number, Congress, 
the FISC, and the public – including privacy and civil liberties advocates – can 
assess how the NSA uses incidental collection.  Moreover, these stakeholders can see 
trends in the numbers.  If the NSA is collecting markedly more content in a given 
year, compared to the previous year, stakeholders can ask why.  Perhaps there are 
more terrorists among U.S. persons (including youths recruited to join ISIS in Syria 
and Iraq).  Or perhaps the NSA is becoming too eager to conduct surveillance and 
 
 148.  For a recent sampling, see Cody M. Poplin, ODNI Releases Three FISC Opinions, LAWFARE (Apr. 20, 
2016, 1:25 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/odni-releases-three-fisc-opinions. 
 149.  USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 292 (2015). 
 150.  See In re Production of Tangible Things, BR 08-13, at 4–5 (FISC Ct. Mar. 2, 2009). 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id.; see also John DeLong & Susan Hennessey, Understanding Footnote 14: NSA Lawyering, Oversight, 
and Compliance, LAWFARE (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-footnote-14-nsa-
lawyering-oversight-and-compliance (discussing this episode). 
 153.  USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, 129 Stat. at 292–93 (providing mandatory reporting requirements 
regarding United States persons). 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  See generally Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Statistical Transparency Report Regarding 
Use of National Security Authorities – Annual Statistics for Calendar Year 2015, IC ON THE RECORD (May 2, 
2016), https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/transparency/odni_transparencyreport_cy2015.  
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collection.  The answer may be the first alternative, the second, or a mix of the two.  
Obliging the NSA to report this information allows stakeholders to ask the crucial 
questions.  It also obliges the NSA to monitor its own practices in the anticipation of 
such stakeholder inquiries.  That complementarity between transparency and 
internal constraints is a vital asset that Congress should enhance in the FAA’s 
reauthorization. 
For example, the NSA has agreed with the PCLOB’s recommendation that the 
NSA provide the FISC with a sample of queries and selectors used by the agency.156  
That is a helpful development, as Judge Hogan indicated in his November, 2015 
opinion.157  Congress should provide expressly that the NSA will furnish such 
samples periodically to the FISC.  However, more is needed. 
C. The FISC and Transparency 
Congress should do more to mandate that Congress and the public know more 
about the procedures followed by the FISC.  Independent reviews have indicated 
that the FISC is not a rubber stamp.158  Nonetheless, this Article has argued that an 
institutionalized public advocate would refine the FISC’s deliberations. With or 
without a full-time public advocate, however, more transparency about the FISC’s 
proceedings would benefit both Congress and the public. 
Congress should do more to facilitate public awareness of the give-and-take at 
the FISC.  For example, Congress should mandate that the Justice Department 
publicly disclose on an annual basis the number of times that the FISC requires 
additional information from government attorneys before approving querying of 
U.S. person information.159  Those statistics would, like the statistics on the total 
number of court orders approving U.S. person queries, provide a baseline for future 
analysis.  If the rate of FISC requests for further information increased markedly in 
a given year, that might indicate that the government was becoming too broad in its 
initial requests.  Legislators and privacy advocates could use that information to 
push for greater precision in initial applications. Perhaps this inference was 
unfounded; if so, the intelligence community could push back and convince the 
doubters.  This dialectic would not entail disclosure of intelligence sources or 
methods; it might merely involve a more open discussion of intelligence agencies’ 
guiding philosophy, supplemented as needed by closed legislative hearings to drill 
 
 156.  See [Name Redacted by Court], at 46–47 n.36 (FISC Ct. Nov. 6, 2015). 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 29 (noting that the FISC’s review of § 702 
certifications “is not limited to the four corners of [agency] documents. The FISC also takes into consideration 
additional filings by the government to supplement or clarify the record, responses to FISC order to supplement 
the record, and the sworn testimony of witnesses at hearings.”) (citations omitted).   
 159.  A publicly disclosed net figure would not need to include identifying information about the subject of 
each query.   
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down into the details. That conversation, like many of the public conversations 
about intelligence policy that took place in the wake of Edward Snowden’s 
disclosures, would be healthy for democracy.160 
Furthermore, Congress should require that the government disclose all occasions 
in which the FISC has commented adversely on the candor of government lawyers, 
or expressed the view that those lawyers had needlessly delayed in disclosing 
episodes of compliance.  For example, in his November, 2015 opinion, Judge 
Hogan remonstrated with government attorneys, asserting that they had not been 
sufficiently forthcoming in explaining implementation of a policy that was several 
years old and retained U.S. person data when that data was helpful in “collection 
avoidance.”161  As explained earlier, the government argued that the minimization 
requirements had an “implicit exception” for collection avoidance.162 That 
exception entailed certain U.S. person information that was helpful in flagging 
entry into the U.S. by certain overseas targets (roamers) who, by virtue of entry into 
the U.S., were no longer appropriate subjects for warrantless collection.163  Since the 
government should cease such collection as soon as possible, information that 
would flag the U.S. entry of targets is useful for compliance with both statutory and 
constitutional obligations.164  However, according to Judge Hogan, the NSA had 
interpreted the implicit exception too broadly, retaining records that it should have 
purged.165  The government argued that it had informed the FISC; however, the 
FISC indicated in its opinion that this disclosure had not been sufficiently clear.166  
 
 160.  If the number stayed steady, stakeholders would have greater assurance of continuity in the NSA’s 
stance.  Either way, the result would be greater legitimacy for the agency. 
 161.  See [Name Redacted by Court], at 58–59 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015); id. at 66–68 (observing that the 
court was “extremely concerned about the NSA’s failure to comply” with its own minimization procedures). 
 162.  See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text. 
 163.  [Name Redacted by Court], at 66–68 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015). 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. at 57–58.   
 166.  See id. at 58 (criticizing the the government’s “failure to convey . . . explicitly” to the court that the 
agency had continued to retain certain information otherwise subject to purge); see also id. at 59 (accepting the 
government’s explanation that some incomplete purges had resulted from technical errors that the agency was 
working to correct).  For a valuable  account of an NSA compliance issue that involved an interpretation of 
authority to collect domestic metadata, see DeLong & Hennessey, supra note 152 (discussing the FISC’s 
disagreement with interpretation by NSA counsel regarding whether search terms used to query daily stream of 
new call records had to comply with standard of “reasonable and articulable suspicion” of links to terrorism 
that FISC had imposed on querying of “archived data”).  The FISC’s concerns about candor do not mean that 
government lawyers were acting in bad faith.  Many of these disputes – perhaps all – involved good faith 
disagreements.  My only point here is that the FISC’s perceptions matter more than any single lawyer’s 
subjective intent.  Because of the importance of the FISC’s perceptions, the agency should highlight to Congress 
any concerns on this score that the court has advanced.      
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Candor is even more vital in ex parte proceedings like those under § 702, where 
there is no other party to bring to light inaccurate or incomplete assertions.167  
Any incidents perceived by the FISC as reflecting a lack of candor by the 
government’s lawyers also have a corrosive effect on the intelligence community’s 
legitimacy.  Repeat players in adjudications or transactions know that their 
reputation is key to their success.168 Based on the trial lawyer’s familiar maxim, 
“false in one thing, false in all,”169 shortfalls in candor in one matter will injure an 
agency’s reputation, ultimately calling into question the accuracy of all agency 
positions.170  Any episode that leads the FISC to question the government’s candor 
should be brought to Congress’ attention so that Congress can determine for itself 
whether the government was sufficiently forthcoming and take appropriate action if 
Congress determines that greater candor was needed.  Ideally, even the prospect of 
such congressional inquiries will spur the government to bend over backwards in 
the name of candor.  That would be an entirely salutary development; the 
government should aim to be comprehensive in its disclosures to the FISC, since 
otherwise the framework simply cannot work as Congress intended.   
D. Properly Recording FBI Queries 
Reform is also needed in the way that the FBI records queries that yield outputs 
from the § 702 database.  Currently, the FBI does not classify as a query a database 
search done by FBI personnel not authorized to view § 702 data.171  That approach 
seems to stand transparency principles on their head: surveillance stakeholders have 
a legitimate interest in discovering the volume of search requests made by personnel 
not eligible to see the results of those requests.  A high volume of requests of this 
sort would indicate that the FBI is either wasting its agents’ time or seeking to access 
information in violation of internal rules.  Either development should trigger 
outside scrutiny.  To address this issue, the FBI’s protocol requires revision. 
Here is what the FBI currently does, per Judge Hogan’s November FISC 
opinion.172  Suppose that an FBI employee who does not have clearance under FBI 
rules to access the § 702 dataset inputs a search request.  Because of automatic 
 
 167.  [Name Redacted by Court], at 59 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015) (describing the “heightened duty of candor 
in ex parte proceedings”); see also  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (providing 
that in an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer “shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that 
will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision”); James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial 
Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1446–47, 1464–65 
(2015) (discussing centrality of candor in ex parte proceedings). 
 168.  See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 124.  
 169.  Falsus In Uno Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 170.  The key factor under the FAA framework is the view of the FISC, not whether, on some construction 
of the law or facts, the government’s position might be justifiable. 
 171.  See [Name Redacted by Court], at 28 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015). 
 172.  Id. at 28–29.   
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controls, that employee will not be able to view the results of that search.173  
However, the employee will receive a notice of a “hit” if the search does turn up 
information that fits the search terms.174  In this situation, the employee’s supervisor 
or a higher-ranking national security employee at the FBI may authorize the 
employee who conducted the original search to access the material, but only if the 
search output “reasonably appears” to be foreign intelligence information, to be 
“necessary to understand foreign intelligence information, or to be evidence of a 
crime.”175 If it is unclear, the original employee can gain access to the search result 
“solely” to discern whether the result meets this test.176  However, the FBI does not 
count such searches as queries.177  Congress should require that the FBI change its 
approach.   
A search request is a “query,” in common parlance.  It should be classified and 
recorded as such.  Failing to count such a request as a query relies on a strained and 
counterintuitive definition of the term, “query.”  In the post-Snowden era, officials 
should avoid these strained definitions.  In the transparency context, treating even a 
frustrated search as a query is the only way to properly align incentives for FBI 
employees who lack access to § 702 data; otherwise, those employees always have a 
work-around available, even if they formulate a search that they know is likely to 
obtain such data.  Recording search requests as queries when they uncover § 702 
data promotes stakeholder review, without unduly chilling agents’ initiative. 
E. Transparency’s Limits: The Chimera of Quantifying Total Incidental Collection 
However, some proposals for transparency in surveillance are either risky or 
irrelevant to the core concerns that should drive § 702’s reauthorization.  For 
example, some commentators have requested that the NSA provide an estimate of 
the number of U.S. persons whose data is incidentally collected pursuant to § 702.178  
As the following paragraphs demonstrate, this proposal for quantification of 
incidental collection is impracticable and could potentially undermine both 
national security and privacy.  
The key to impracticability of the quantification proposal is its failure to 
acknowledge a vital aspect of § 702 highlighted in this Article: the difference 
between upstream and downstream collection.179  Providing an estimate of 
incidentally collected U.S. person data in the upstream program is exceptionally 
 
 173.  Id. at 28. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. at 29. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  See [Name Redacted by Court], at 28 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015). 
 178.  See Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4, at 11–12 (statement of David 
Medine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board). 
 179.  See supra notes 63–81 and accompanying text. 
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difficult since the upstream program’s stationing at internet hubs means that the 
number may fluctuate wildly with routers’ search for the most efficient pathways 
for transmitting messages.180  Moreover, the MCTs unavoidably collected (given 
current technology) under the upstream program will also fluctuate with respect to 
U.S. person content – some MCTs will have higher content, others less, depending 
on technical details of internet transmission that have no relationship to the 
government’s targeting criteria.181  In the upstream context, therefore, providing a 
specific number will be technically difficult and not particularly illuminating about 
the factors governing collection or use of § 702 data.  The better course is to take 
steps outlined earlier in this Article: limits on the querying of upstream U.S. person 
data, which the FISC and the NSA have already imposed and Congress should 
codify in § 702’s reauthorization, and requiring that the NSA use the best feasible 
technology to limit incidental upstream collection of MCTs.   
In the downstream context, requiring that the NSA provide a precise figure for 
incidentally collected U.S. person data will pose another risk: supplying information 
to our adversaries that will enable them to adjust their tradecraft to avoid detection.  
In the tailored downstream program, disclosing the volume of incidentally collected 
U.S. person data would provide important clues to our adversaries about the scope 
of our intelligence capabilities.  U.S. intelligence agencies may collect content and 
metadata on virtually all of the contacts in the U.S. of tasked selectors.182  
Intelligence analysts cast this wide net because they cannot know in advance which 
contacts are significant and which are trivial or innocuous.183  Widespread 
publication of a number that specifically indicates that U.S. intelligence agencies 
cast a wide net may alert adversaries, encouraging them to adopt means to hinder 
surveillance such as encryption or spoofed U.S. VPNs.184 The gain to public 
deliberation supplied by such disclosures is outweighed by these adverse intelligence 
consequences.   
Finally, as a proponent of the quantification proposal concedes,185 the proposal 
could undermine privacy.  For MCTs collected upstream, the NSA can readily 
 
 180.  See DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 56. 
 181.  Id.  
 182.  FISA Amendments Act Oversight/Reauthorization: Senate Judiciary Committee-Hearing, 114th Cong. 
(2015) (testimony of Matthew Olsen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center) (last visited Sept. 11, 2016) 
(explaining value of tracing possible U.S. contacts through hypothetical example involving two foreign targets 
in Syria who share a U.S. person’s passport photo). 
 183.  See id. (observing that sharing a U.S. passport photo could be “innocent” but might signal a more 
troubling link and would be of interest to the FBI).  
 184.  See Kris, supra note 1, at 22–24 (pointing to the fact that that ISIL has provided guidance to its 
members and affiliates on the use of encryption and that this could extend to their use of TOR, VPNs or similar 
services). 
 185.  See Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4, at 10 (statement of David 
Medine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board). 
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detect that the message does not match a tasked selector.  However, the agency may 
need to review substantially more of the transmission records and content of the 
communication to determine if it involves U.S. persons.  This inquiry will be 
intrusive, perhaps involving human inspection.  That human review of 
communications might be necessary to classify a communication as involving U.S. 
persons, even when the communication would not be flagged in any query of 
incidentally collected information and therefore might not come to any analyst’s 
attention.  In other words, the quantification task might require human review of 
information that would otherwise not trigger human review prior to purging the 
information.  Quantification therefore poses a gratuitous risk of privacy intrusions 
that Congress should avoid, not embrace.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In reauthorizing § 702, Congress faces fateful choices.  One salient task is 
reinforcing the strides in transparency and accountability that the intelligence 
community made after Edward Snowden’s disclosures and that Congress codified 
in the USA Freedom Act.186  However, a rigid approach would rob intelligence 
analysts of the agility they need to protect the public against dynamic threats.187  
This Article strives to reach a middle ground that combines effective foreign 
intelligence collection with a concern for civil liberties.   
Congress should do more to encourage the NSA to use technology as a tool to 
enhance privacy.  The NSA and the FBI already use technology to filter out certain 
data that is irrelevant and prevent unauthorized access to databases.188  Congress 
should build on these efforts without stifling innovation within the intelligence 
community.  To achieve these goals, Congress should mandate that the NSA use the 
best feasible technology to limit incidental collection of U.S. person data.   
On requirements for querying U.S. person data, Congress should expressly 
recognize that collection under § 702 is a tale of two programs: the upstream 
program that collects foreign intelligence at internet hubs, and the more tailored 
downstream program, in which ISPs acquire only those communications that 
match tasked selectors tied to terrorism, espionage, weapons proliferation, or other 
national security and foreign affairs concerns.  Currently, both the FISC and the IC 
 
 186.  Brand, Transparency, supra note 7 (commenting on National Intelligence’s plan to implement new 
transparency principles as showing a new habit of transparency); see also Cordero, supra note 134 (describing 
transparency principles announced by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper). 
 187.  [Name Redacted by Court], at 29 n.27 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015) (arguing the FBI’s current practice 
which disallows downstream queries nonetheless gives the FBI the agility it needs). 
 188.  See id. at 28 (noting that technological safeguards applicable to FBI queries of § 702 data will deny 
access to data if official posing query has not received proper training or is otherwise not authorized to obtain 
access); see also Inglis & Kosseff, supra note 1, at 12 (explaining that although NSA has been unable to design 
and implement a filter that reliably and uniformly collects only those specific emails in an MCT that are 
responsive to specific search requests, the agency nonetheless filters emails in other contexts). 
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rightly subject upstream collection to tighter regulation, because incidental 
collection of irrelevant U.S. person communications is more likely in this space.189  
Congress should codify these upstream constraints, requiring a court order for 
querying of incidentally collected upstream communications.   
In the downstream space, however, requiring a court order would be 
inappropriate.190  Downstream collection is already far more tailored, and U.S. 
person communications are more likely here than in the upstream context to reflect 
national security or other foreign intelligence concerns.191  Requiring a court order 
to query such information would make it more difficult for intelligence analysts to 
connect the dots, without concomitant benefits for privacy.192   
While rejecting an unduly rigid approach to intelligence collection, 
reauthorization should enhance the FISC’s deliberations with a more 
institutionalized public advocate.  The system put in place by the USA Freedom Act, 
in which the FISC can seek help from a panel of amici curiae, should be 
supplemented by a public advocate who can push back against the government in a 
wider range of cases.  This opposing voice will help keep the government honest 
and ensure that the FISC gets the range of views it needs for sound decisions.193 
Transparency is also a part of this process.  Here, too, Congress should enhance 
the FISC’s deliberations, but legislate with a clear understanding of the nature of 
both upstream and downstream collection.  Surveillance critics’ call for an estimate 
of the total number of incidentally collected U.S. person communications is 
unworkable in the upstream program, where the shifting nature of efficient internet 
transmissions and the NSA’s unavoidable collection of MCTs make a precise 
number impossible to obtain.194  In the downstream program, an estimate would be 
imprudent since it would publicize too much about the NSA’s capabilities.195   
However, Congress should insist on greater transparency regarding the 
government’s interactions with the FISC.  For example, Congress should require 
that the government disclose to both Congress and the public (using redactions 
 
 189.  See [Name Redacted by Court], at 44 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015). 
 190.  In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 
1011 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (citing the “high degree of probability that requiring a warrant would hinder the 
government’s ability to collect time-sensitive information”). 
 191.  [Name Redacted by Court], at 43–44 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015). 
 192.  See In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1011–12 (observing that requiring a warrant would “impede the vital 
national security interests . . . at stake”). 
 193.  See Mondale, et al., supra note 18, at 2297–98 (arguing that as long as FISC proceedings don’t resemble 
traditional warrant proceedings, there must be adverse positions presented); see also Vladeck, supra note 19, at 
1176-77 (positing that one of the more common themes of calls for post-Snowden reforms to United States 
surveillance law is to provide for more adversarial participation before the FISC). 
 194.  See DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 56–57. 
 195.  See Kris, supra note 1, at 22–24 (observing that alerting enemies of the NSA’s downstream capabilities 
may encourage them to adopt encryption or VPNs). 
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when necessary) when the FISC expresses any concern about the candor of 
government attorneys.  That candor is central to the FISC’s work, especially when 
the government makes ex parte requests.196  Candor serves as a bridge between the 
government and the court, ensuring that the latter has the information it needs.197  
Gaps in that bridge call for urgent maintenance.  The prospect of expressly flagging 
such gaps for Congress may have a useful ex ante effect, diminishing the incidence 
of such episodes.198   
In sum, ISIS’s rise makes reauthorization of § 702 an urgent priority.  Fears of 
terrorism should not disable the movement toward greater NSA transparency and 
accountability.  However, a nuanced view of the statute that distinguishes between 
upstream and downstream collection is necessary to preserve the United States’ 
foreign intelligence capabilities.  This Article has aimed to provide a blueprint for 
that delicate balance.    
 
 
 196.  Goitein & Patel, supra note 4, at 46–47. 
 197.  [Name Redacted by Court], at 59 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015) (describing the “heightened duty of candor 
in ex parte proceedings” and the overall importance of candor in general). 
 198.  See supra Section IV (discussing the risks and benefits of transparency in this context); see also Gilson 
& Mnookin, supra note 124, at 513 (hypothesizing that repeat litigators must protect their relationship with the 
court and their reputation is key to success). 
